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CASE NOTES
Constitutional Law—Public Utilities—The State Action and Due
Process Doctrines—Lucas v. WiseOnsin Electric Power Co.1—The
plaintiff, Alvin Lucas, was a customer of the defendant Wisconsin
Electric Company (hereinafter the Electric Company). On December
23, 1969, the plaintiff allegedly paid his bill for the November-
December period in cash at the defendant's offices but failed to obtain
a stamped receipt. He continued to receive electric service and con-
tinued to make monthly payments even after moving to a new residence
in January 1970. On July 1, 1970, the defendant notified the plaintiff
that its records showed an arrearage for the November-December
period and that if it was not settled within five days his services
would be terminated. To prevent such termination, plaintiff Lucas
commenced a class actions in federal district court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 19838
 and immediately moved for a temporary restraining order.
The complaint alleged that (1) the action of the defendant utility
company was action taken "under color of"4 state law since it was
taken pursuant to a rule of the Wisconsin Public Service Commission
and in accordance with Company regulations which were approved by
the Commission, and (2) termination of the plaintiff's service by the
defendant company without prior adequate notice and an impartial
hearing constituted deprivation of due process of law in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The district court dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and
for failure to state a substantial federal question.' On appeal, the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit : reviewed the case en banc and
HELD: (1) the electric utility's disconnection of service in accordance
with the regulation of the State Public Service Commission is not action
"under color of" state law within the meaning of section 1983, and
(2) even assuming that the required state action did exist, where state
remedies, both informal and judicial, are available, failure to provide
an impartial hearing prior to termination of service does not violate
the consumer's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.
I Civil No. 71-1113 (7th Cir., Aug. 2, 1972). Hereinafter all citations will be to
the Slip Opinion.
2
 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 322 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Wis. 1970).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges,. or immunities secured by the Con-
stitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
4 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), quoted in note 3 supra.
5 U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "[Nlor shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
6 322 F. Supp. at 341..
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There has been a strong judicial trend in recent years toward
expanding the area in which the requirements of procedural due process
necessitate that a state, or one acting under color of its laws, give
notice and an impartial hearing prior to the termination or suspension
of any privileges, benefits, services, interests, or entitlements' which
are alleged to be constitutional rights .° By denying the plaintiff's re-
quest for adequate notice and an impartial hearing before discontinu-
ance of his electric service, the Seventh Circuit in Lucas has refused to
introduce these procedural safeguards into the public utilities area.
The purpose of this casenote is to assess the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Lucas in light of other recent court decisions in related
areas of the law. This objective will best be realized by structuring
the analysis in terms of two basic inquiries. The first will consider the
soundness of the court's finding in Lucas that the conduct of the
defendant electric company was not state action. The second question
will be whether, assuming that there was such state action, the court
erred in holding that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not require an impartial bearing on the facts of the case.
STATE ACTION
The Seventh Circuit in Lucas, in finding no state action in the
conduct of the Wisconsin Electric Power Company, regarded itself as
bound by its decision in Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co.,' a
Seventh Circuit case decided in 1969. In that case the plaintiff brought
an action under section 1983, in which he claimed that the action of
the defendant telephone company in terminating his "Call-Pak" ser-
vice' pursuant to regulations filed with state authorities violated his
7
 A statutory "entitlement" is a "property right" within the meaning of the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was the position taken by the United
States Supreme Court in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970), in which the
Court held that welfare benefits "are a matter of statutory entitlement for persons
qualified to receive them" and therefore were constitutionally protected. In Davis
v. Weir, 328 F. Supp. 317, 321 (N.D. Ga. 1971), the court found that a consumer's interest
in a continued supply of water, although not traditionally considered a "property right,"
was, nevertheless, an "entitlement" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
8
 See, e.g., Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of an operator's license
pursuant to a state financial responsibility statute) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (termination of welfare benefits) ; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969) (garnishment of wages) ; Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1970) (revoca-
tion of parole) ; Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.
1970) (eviction of tenants in public housing) ; Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Educa-
tion, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (expulsion of public
school students); Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y.
1970) (attachment of property); Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970)
(execution under innkeeper's statutory lien) ; Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112 (D,
Mass. 1969) (failure to renew teacher's contract in public school system).
9
 407 F.2d 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 (1969).
10 A special telephone service provided for a flat fee instead of at a rate based upon
the time and distance of the calls. Other telephone service of plaintiff was not discon-
tinued by defendant. 407 F.2d at 625.
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Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. The plaintiff cited cases
with similar facts". in support of his contention that the telephone
company acted under color of state law when it terminated his service.
The court, however, in reference to these cases, stated: "In all of the
cases cited where conduct under color of law was found to be present,
there existed greater state involvement or control than is alleged in
this case."12 In Kadlec, the only state involvement in the activities of
the defendant which was alleged by the plaintiff was the defendant's
filing of its regulation with state authorities. Hence the court ruled
that the complaint did not state sufficient facts upon which a finding
of state action could be based."
In a concurring opinion, Judge Kerner agreed with the majority
"that the mere filing of regulations with a state does not convert pri-
vate action under such regulations into action under color of state
law."" He went on to add, however, that:
[Minder appropriate circumstances, it may be possible to
demonstrate that a privately-owned publicly-regulated utility
... has a sufficient nexus with or dependence on a state as to
make some of its actions under color of law."
Judge Kerner then cited a number of factors relevant in determin-
ing the existence of state action. Among them were the following:
(1) whether or not the private entity is subject to close regulation by
a state agency, (2) whether or not the regulations filed with the
regulatory body must be approved to be effective, (3) whether or not
the entity is given a total or partial monopoly by the regulatory body,
(4) whether or not the regulatory body controls the rates charged
and/or the services offered by the entity, and (5) whether or not the
actions of the entity are subject to review by the regulatory body.
Judge Kerner then pointed out that none of these issues was raised
by the plaintiff's complaint in Kadlec. He stated:
[A] complaint which relies on 42	 § 1983 must affirma-
tively show that the acts complained of were done under color
of law. The amended complaint before us lacks the specific
allegations (as set forth above) which would show this neces-
sary statutory element."
When Lucas properly presented the Seventh Circuit with the issues
that Judge Kerner had's° explicitly outlined, the court lightly dismissed
some of them as irrelevant and failed even to consider the others. In-
stead, the court declared—without giving any reason for so doing-
11
 The court generally referred to these cases but did not specifically cite them.
12 407 F.2d at 627 (emphasis added).
la Id. at 626.
14 Id. at 627.
15
 Id. at 628.
16 Id.
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that the variety of regulatory controls imposed on the defendant electric
company by both the state legislature and by the Public Utilities Com-
mission were "obviously insufficient to bring private conduct within
the coverage of this federal statute. 717 The court then went on to hold
that private conduct can be transformed into action "under color of
state law" only where it receives significant support from the state,"
that the only support relevant to the case was the granting by the state
to the electric company of monopoly protection" and that "with respect
to the issues presented in this litigation, the monopoly factor does not
provide the necessary ingredient of added state support of private
conduct—the termination of electric service—which will transform an
issue of state regulatory policy into a federal civil rights case under
§ 1983.'0
It is submitted that the majority in Lucas should not have given
such short shrift to the issues set forth above by Judge Kerner in the
Kadlec case, but rather should have examined them more closely to
determine their applicability to the fact situation presented in Lucas.
If they had done so they might well have reached a different conclusion
on the question of state action and at any rate would have found the
two cases distinguishable. That is, while the plaintiff's complaint in
Kadlec did not permit the Kadlec court to reach the issues that Judge
Kerner outlined, those issues were before the Lucas court. Furthermore,
a persuasive argument can be made that a resolution of these questions
would have indicated that the defendant electric company, in terminat-
ing service to the plaintiff, was acting under color of state law.
For example, it was assumed by the court in Lucas that the state's
regulation of the Wisconsin Electric Power Company was "pervasive.'
Any doubt regarding this point should be dispelled by an examina-
tion of the various statutes regulating the Company's activities cited
in both the majority22 and dissenting" opinions. Furthermore, all
utilities in Wisconsin are required by law to file with the Commission
all rules and regulations which in any way affect the service or
product," and such rules to be effective must be approved by the
Commission." Too, the Lucas court noted that the Public Service
Commission expressly approved the Company's regulation concerning
termination of service." It was also admitted in Lucas that the defen-
dant utility enjoys a monopoly in its particular area by operation of
17 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip Op. at 24. The federal statute referred
to is 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1970).
18 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip Op, at 24-25.
19 Id. at 26.
20 Id. at 28-29.
21 Id. at 4 n.5.
22 Id. at 4.
28 Id. at 37-39 (dissenting opinion).
24 WIS. Stat. Ann. 11 196.19(2) (1957).
25 Appellant's Brief at 5-6, Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.
26 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip Op. at 12.
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law.27
 The rates charged 28 and the services offered" by the defendant
utility were recognized by the court as subject to the most thorough
control by the Wisconsin Public Service Commission." Lastly, the
actions of the utility, as the majority opinion in Lucas pointed out,
are subject to review by the regulatory body of the Commission. In
short, these facts make it apparent that the Kadlec and Lucas cases
are clearly distinguishable, and it was by no means required that
Kadlec be overruled in order for the court in Lucas to find state action
in that case. It is submitted, therefore, that the court erred in finding
the Kadlec decision applicable, on the issue of state action, to the facts
in Lucas.
There is no set formula to determine what constitutes state action.
Decisions in this area, therefore, have traditionally been made on a
case by case basis." The courts have defined action taken under
color of state law in terms of "significant involvement"' of the state
in the affairs and activities of the private individual or organization.
They have usually found such involvement wherever "[t] he state has
so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence [with the
otherwise private entity whose conduct is said to have violated the
Fourteenth Amendment] that it musU be recognized as a joint partici-
pant in the challenged activity . . . ."" Specifically, a quick survey
shows that in enumerating the elements of state action, most courts
have utilized one or more of the type of criteria suggested by Judge
Kerner. In determining whether or not state action exists the courts
have generally found it helpful to consider any one or more of the
following criteria: (1) the amount of assistance and support," financial
or otherwise, which the state has rendered the individual or organiza-
tion; (2) the motive" for giving such aid and support; (3) the June-
27 Id. at 26, 37.
28 Id. at 37-38. Sec also Wis. Stat. Ann. fl 196.37, 196.03, 196.22, 196.60 (1957).
20
 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip. Op. at 37-38. See also Wis. Stat. Ann.
196.03, 196.20, 196.37 (1957).
30 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip Op. at 4 n.5.
81 Cf. Comment, Eviction of State's Tenants Necessitates a Limited Hearing Accord-
ing to the State Action Doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 Buffalo L. Rev. 524,
526 (1972): "The difficulty in formulating this definition [of state action] arose because
each case differs in the degree of state involvement, thereby necessitating a determination
of state action on a case by case basis."
32 See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967); Bright v. Isenbarger,
314 F. Supp. 1382, 1395 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
83
 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S: 715, 725 (1961).
84 See, e.g., Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), discussed in
text at notes 42, 44 infra; Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir.
1971), discussed in text at notes 47, 48, 49, 54 infra; Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963); Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212
(4th Cir.) cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945), discussed in text at note 57 infra.
36 See, e.g., Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), dis-
cussed in text at notes 57, 58 infra; Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964),
discussed in text at notes 59, 60 infra.
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tion," public or private, performed by the individual or organization;
(4) the degree of control' 7 exercised by the state over the individual
or organization; and (5) the relationship"' between the state involve-
ment and the activity that caused the injury complained of.
It is admitted that in testing for state action these criteria have
hitherto been used in contexts different from that presented in Lucas.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the application of all these criteria
to the facts of Lucas is the soundest way of determining whether or not
there was state action in that case."
88 See, e.g., Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (ND. Ind. 1970), discussed in
text at note 62 infra; Norris v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451
(D. Md. 1948).
87 See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972), discussed in note 39
infra; Public Utilities Comm'n v, Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), discussed in text at notes
75, 76, 77 infra; Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971),
discussed in text at note 78 infra; Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (ND. Ind.
1970) discussed in text at note 74 infra; Mitchell v. Boys Club, 157 F. Supp. 101
(D.D.C. 1957), discussed in text at notes 71, 72, 73 infra.
88 See, e.g., Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968); Bright v. Isenbarger, 314
F. Supp. 1382 (ND. Ind. 1970), discussed in text at note 86 infra.
88 In the recent case of Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972), decided on
June 12, 1972, the United States Supreme Court used much the same approach in deter-
mining whether or not the conduct of a private club in excluding a Negro guest con-
stituted state action. The plaintiff in this case, a Negro guest of a white member of the
defendant private club, was refused service by the defendant solely on account of his
race. lie thereupon brought an action in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
seeking injunctive relief. The plaintiff claimed that because the Pennsylvania Liquor
Board, an agent of the state, had issued the defendant a private club license that au-
thorized the sale of alcoholic beverages on its premises, the refusal of service to him was
state action for the purposes of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The district court found that the defendant's guest practices were discriminatory, agreed
with the plaintiff that state action was present, and declared the liquor license invalid as
long as the defendant continued its discriminatory practices. In finding state action the
court relied heavily on what it believed to be the "pervasive" nature of the regulation
of private clubs by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board.
On appeal the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the facts alleged and proved
were insufficient to show state action. Id. at 1973. In addressing itself to the matter of
regulation of the defendant's activities by the Liquor Control Board the Court said:
"However detailed this type of regulation may be in some particulars, it cannot be said
to in any way foster or encourage racial discrimination." Id. While the Court assumed
that the state's control over the defendant's activities was as extensive as the district
court found it to be, it failed to find any relationship between such state involvement
and the activity causing the injury, namely, the racial discrimination engaged in by the
defendant.
The Court also found it significant that the defendant club was not a place of
public accomodation, nor did it perform any type of public function. Id. at 1972. Spe-
cifically, the Court said:
ITThe Moose Lodge building is located on land owned by it, not by any
public authority. Far from apparently holding itself out as a place of public
accomodation, Moose Lodge quite ostentatiously proclaims the fact that it is
not open to the public at large. Nor is it located and operated in such surround-
ings that although private in name, it discharges a function or performs a
service that would otherwise in all likelihood be performed by the State.
Id.
In further discussing the issue of state action the Court noted that the defendant
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A. Assistance and Support
In certain cases the courts have found state assistance rendered
to private organizations sufficient in itself to qualify private action
as state action.° This type of case, however, is limited to those in-
stances in which the individual or organization is supported entirely,
or almost entirely, by grants from the state. In most cases the matter
of state assistance is not determinative of the issue of state action, but
is considered one factor to be used by the court in reaching a decision.'
1. The Grant of a Monopoly
In Lucas, the fact that the state has granted the defendant a
monopoly on the distribution of electric service in a certain area of the
state would appear to be of prime significance in determining the matter
of state assistance and support. Although the fact that a private entity
enjoys a monopoly in its particular field does not automatically make
its activity action under color of state law, it deserves consideration as
a vital factor.
One case reflecting this idea is Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollak." In this case a group of disgruntled commuters brought suit
against the defendant Public Utilities Commission alleging that the
conduct of the Capital Transit Company, a public utility regulated by
the Commission, violated their constitutional rights under the First
and Fifth Amendments by broadcasting radio programs through loud-
speakers in its streetcars and buses. The plaintiffs specifically contended
that the radio programs so broadcast made it difficult for them to
converse and communicate with one another and invaded their rights
of privacy. At the time of suit the Capital Transit Company enjoyed a
virtual monopoly of street railway and bus transportation in the Dis-
trict of Columbia. This monopoly, furthermore, was made possible by
club received no financial assistance from the state, id. at 1970, that the state had not
conferred a monopoly on the defendant in the distribution of liquor within the state,
id. at 1972, and that "there is no suggestion in this record that the Pennsylvania statutes
and regulations governing the sale of liquor are intended either overtly or covertly to
encourage discrimination." Id. The only state-rendered assistance and support given to
the defendant was in the form of a liquor license, and since there was no substantial
connection between this and the defendant's racially discriminatory policies, such sup-
port, standing alone, was not sufficient to implicate the state in the discriminatory
actions of the defendant. As the Court put it, it "has never [been] held . . . that dis-
crimination by an otherwise private entity would be violative of the Equal Protection
Clause if the entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from the State.. .." Id.
at 1971.
Basing its decision on the foregoing factors, the Court held that the state had not
suffidently implicated Itself in the discriminatory policies of the defendant so as to make
these policies state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 1973.
40
 See, e.g., Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir.
1963).
41 See, e.g., Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970) ; Mitchell v.
Boys Club, 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957).
42 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
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a congressional statute" prohibiting the establishment of any competi-
tive street railway or bus line without the issuance of a certificate by
the Public Service Commission to the effect that such line was necessary
for the convenience of the public. The Court in Pollak did find gov-
ernmental action. Even though it declined to base its finding solely on
the fact that the company had a federally authorized monopoly of
street car transportation," it is evident that this fact was a crucial
element.
When in addition to a monopoly other elements of assistance are
present, together with state control of the organization's activities, then
the probability of a finding of state action is greatly increased. For
instance, in Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co.,' the plaintiff brought an antitrust suit against the defendant
electric company, which had a state-conferred monopoly on the dis-
tribution of electric service in its area. It charged the defendant with
engaging in certain practices amounting to conspiracies to eliminate
gas as an energy source competitive with electricity. The state agency
involved was the State Corporation Commission (SCC), a regulatory
arm of the state which had the authority to regulate the activities of
the defendant electric company. In this respect, then, it played the
same role as did the Illinois Commerce Commission in Kadlec and
the Public Service Commission in Lucas. Although the SCC was aware
of the defendant's activities, it had made no investigations of these
activities, nor had it given any affirmative approval of the defendant's
plans, and accordingly was less involved in the activity causing injury
than were the state agencies in either Kadlec or Lucas. Nevertheless,
the court found state action, holding the SCC's administrative silence
equivalent to consent."
In the similar case of Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co.,' an
antitrust suit was brought by a gas company against an electric com-
pany in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's rate schedules,
together with certain of its practices involving distribution of electricity,
were purposely aimed at driving the plaintiff out of business. As in
Washington Gas Light, the defendant electric company had a monopoly
on the distribution of electricity in its particular area. The issue pre-
sented was whether the activities complained of were the product of
state action. The court found that the rates and practices under attack
originated with the defendant utility. It also found that the Georgia
Public Utility Commission, which was authorized and empowered to
regulate electric utilities such as defendant, had approved the defen-
dant's rates and practices. The court held that the Commission's
approval meant that the particular rates and practices were the work
43 Id. at 454 n.1.
44 Id. at 462.
45 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
48 Id. at 252.
47 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 92 S. Ct. 732 (1972).
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products of the Commission." In finding state action, the court em-
phasized that the defendant company enjoyed a monopoly status
conferred upon it by the state."
In applying the rationale of Washington Gas Light Co. and Gas
Light Co. to the situation presented by Lucas, it is suggested that it
would be unfair to permit a utility which enjoys a state-authorized
monopoly to avoid prosecution under'the antitrust laws on the grounds
that its action is state action, while :at the same time permitting the
same utility, enjoying the same monopoly, to deny that its actions are
state actions in a suit brought against it by a private individual. Thus
it can be concluded that although the granting of a monopoly by the
state to a private organization will not usually, by itself, be sufficient,
in terms of assistance and support, to subject the actions of the latter
to the requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, such a monopoly, when it is granted in an area of vital public
concern, and when it is coupled with other elements of control, is a
significant factor in determining whether or not state action exists.
2. State Approval
Another way for the state to render significant assistance to a
private entity is for it to enact statutes and, through its various agen-
cies, to promulgate rules and regulations which encourage support of
or approve a particular course of action taken by that entity. As the
fact situation in Lucas shows, the state of Wisconsin had materially
aided the electric company by enacting a regulation" empowering the
Company to terminate the electric service of any consumer who fails
to pay a bill without requiring a prior impartial hearing to determine
the validity of the bill. The state had: also approved rules promulgated
by the Company setting out the procedure to be used for discontinuing
service.' While it is true, as Judge Stevens pointed out in his majority
opinion in Lucas, that section 113.13 (4), together with the Commis-
sion's approval of the Company's rules relating to termination of ser-
vice, does not expand the powers the Company would have had at
common law," this does not render the Commission's action insignifi-
48 Id. at 1140.
42 Id.
55 Wis. Adm. Code § 113.13 (1956) : "(4) . DISCONNECT RULE. (a) Service may
be disconnected if a customer's current bill for service as defined in the utility's filed
rules is not paid within a reasonable period set forth in said rules."
51
 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co.,.Slip Op. at 5. The section of the electric
company's rules, applicable to arrearages amounting to between $5 and $20, is as follows:
1. A written notice shall be sent to the customer, stating the amount the cus-
tomer is in arrears, and notifying him that service will be disconnected if such
arrears are not paid within five days.
2. If the arrears remain unpaid . . . service may be disconnected without
further notice to the customer.
52 The general rule as stated in 64 Am. Jur. 2d. Public Utilities § 62 (1972) indicates
as follows:
It is the general rule ... that either a private concern or a municipality furnish-
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cant. It must be conceded that if the Commission had so desired it
could have prevented the Company from terminating service on such
short notice—five days—or from terminating at all before an impartial
hearing was granted. The fact that the Commission did not do so is
itself a matter of considerable benefit to the Company. Furthermore,
the Commission's rule on termination, made effective by its approval
of the Company's regulations regarding termination, acted as an official
seal of approval for the Company's activities. This approval lent
moral support, if nothing else, to the Company in carrying out its dis-
connect procedures. This was effectively pointed out in Washington
Gas Light, in which the court found that the activities of the defendant
electric company amounted to state action even though the Commis-
sion regulating the utility neither required, authorized, nor encouraged
these activities. The court said:
The argument [that the defendant's conduct is individual
and not state action] is not without merit but the conclusion
is not inevitable unless one equates administrative silence with
abandonment of administrative duty. It is just as sensible to
infer that silence means consent, i.e., approval. Indeed, the
latter inference seems the more likely one when we remember
that even the gas company concedes that the SCC possessed
adequate regulatory powers to stop VEPCO if it chose to do
so . . . .58
In the Gas Light Company case, the court, in finding state ac-
tion in the conduct of the defendant in offering free underground
electric service lines to new home builders in return for all-electric
installations, said:
Defendant's conduct cannot be characterized as individual
action when we consider the state's intimate involvement
with the rate-making process. Though the rates and prac-
tices originated with the regulated utility, Georgia Power,
the facts make it plain that they emerged from the Commis-
sion as products of the Commission."
ing a utility service to the public, such as gas, electricity or water, may prescribe
and enforce a rule or regulation which provides for the shutting off of the
service from a consumer who has defaulted in payment therefor. This right to
cut off a consumer's service is frequently given by statute or charter, but the
rule is the same even in the absence of legislative authority.
68 Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 252 (4th
Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
64 Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971). The
state of Wisconsin has also aided the defendant by granting it the power of eminent
domain (Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 31.15, 32.02(5),(6) (1957)) and by authorizing it to enter
private dwellings for certain limited purposes (Wis. Stat. Ann. § 196.171 (1957)). Since
neither of these powers was exercised by the defendant in Lucas so as to impinge on the
plaintiff's right to a continued supply of electricity, their significance on the question of
state action is questionable.
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The state in Lucas was involved in the process of terminating
electric service to the consumer. Although it was the Company which
enacted the five day notice rule, it was specifically authorized to do
so by the Commission, and in the end it was the Commission which
approved the rule, thereby making it effective.
By enacting and approving rules and regulations permitting the
Company to disconnect a consumer's electric service, the state has
substantially aided the Company and has done so in ways not made
applicable to other private organizations. Thus it seems reasonable
to contend that both by its grant of a monopoly to the Wisconsin
Electric Power Company, and by its omnipresent regulation of oper-
ating procedures, the state has "significantly involved" itself, in terms
of assistance and support, with the electric company in Lucas.
B. Motive for Assistance and Function Performed"
Where the state's purpose is not just to help the recipient entity
in its own private capacity, but is also to enable the entity to per-
form a public function which the state would be obligated to perform
if the entity did not do so, the courts find such a combination of
factors indicative of state action se
In Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library," the issue before the
Fourth Circuit was whether or not the action of a privately endowed
and managed library, in refusing to accept a qualified black applicant
into its training programs, was state action. The court found that
the library was almost totally dependent upon the city of Baltimore's
voluntary appropriations, but did not rest its decision that there was
state action on the mere fact of such assistance. The court's holding
stressed the fact that the state's purpose for so assisting the defen-
dant library was that the latter could perform an activity which has
traditionally been considered a proper function of the state." Simi-
larly in Lucas the state's purpose in assisting the electric company
was to enable the latter to perform the function of distributing elec-
tricity to the public—a function that, it is submitted, can be regarded
as a municipal function. This same type of reasoning was used by
a federal district court in Farmer v. Moses," in finding state action
in the refusal of the New York World's Fair Corporation (NYWFC),
a private entity, to permit would-be picketers to picket on property
leased to NYWFC by the city of New York. The court found that
the city and state of New York had rendered considerable assistance
and support to the NYWFC and, in commenting on the purpose for
which such aid was given said:
55 Since these two criteria are so closely related they will be considered together
for purposes of determining the existence or nonexistence of state action.
00 See, e.g., Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 721 (1945); Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
57 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
58 149 F.2d at 217.
59 232 F. Supp. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
327
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
The Fair purposes . . . are to organize, construct, hold and
operate a world's fair in the City of New York for the ex-
clusively educational purposes of educating the peoples of
the world as to the interdependence of nations and the need
for universal peace. Educating the populace is a proper func-
tion of the state, and where the state creates separate in-
strumentalities to carry on its work, the latter may become
subject to the constitutional restraints imposed upon the state
itself 6 D
On the other hand, in some cases in which state assistance was
found to be considerable, courts have refused to find state action be-
cause there was no "public purpose" in the state's grant." A case
in point 'is that of Bright v. Isenbarger.° 2 This case involved a civil
rights action brought by a student of a private parochial school against
the principal of the school. The student claimed that the summary
manner in which she was expelled for violation of a school disciplin-
ary rule violated her rights to procedural due process. The primary
issue in the case was whether or not the defendant principal was
acting under color of state law in expelling the plaintiff. The federal
district court found, among other things, that the state had given
financial assistance to the defendant private school by means of tax
exemptions. However, the court also found that a parochial school
education is not a public function, and that therefore the state's pur-
pose in aiding the school was not to enable the school to do a job
traditionally thought to be in the domain of the public authority.
The courts have similarly found a lack of public function in cases
involving newspapers," private clubs" and "[g]olf clubs, social cen-
ters, [and] luncheon clubs .... 766
A particular business or enterprise performs a public function
if the goods or services it renders are of concern to the general public
or any portion thereof—as distinguished from particular individuals-66
if these goods or services are for the benefit and advantage of the
public," and if the public, as such, has an interest in the goods or
services such that it has a legal right to their use which cannot be
60
 Id. at 158.
61 See, e.g., Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970); Norris v.
Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948).
62
 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Lid. 1970).
68
 E.g., Chicago Joint Board, AmaI. Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435
F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1970); Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
64 E.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972).
05 Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301-02 (1966).
66 See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 97 F.2d 726 (8th Cir.
1938); In re United States, 28 F. Supp. 758 (W.D.N.Y. 1939); McNeil v. City of
Montague, 124 Cal. App. 2d 326, 268 P.2d 497 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); City of Passaic
v. State, 30 N.J. Super. 32, 103 A.2d 174 (Super. Ct. 1954).
67 See, e.g., Montana Power Co. v. Bokma, 153 Mont. 390, 457 P.2d 769 (1969);
Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 1 II12d 509, 116 N.E.2d 394
(1953).
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denied or withdrawn at the will of the owner." It is submitted that
the distribution of electricity by the electric company in Lucas is a
service which meets these requirements. It is a matter of concern and
interest to the public in general, or at least to that portion of the
public which chooses to use electric power as opposed to gas or coal,
to light and heat its homes and places of business; it is a service
which provides a great benefit and advantage to this sector of the
public; and it is a service to which every member of the public
located in the electric company's area of operation has a legal right."
It is submitted, therefore, that the distribution of electricity is a pub-
lic function, and that the state's purpose in Lucas, in rendering aid
and support to the electric company, was not just to help the com-
pany in its private capacity, but was to better enable the company
to perform a public function of vital interest to all members of the
community. The state could, if it so desired, take it upon itself to
provide electricity to the public. If no private organization chose to
perform this function, the state would have an obligation to do so.
The state's motive, therefore, in assisting the Company is the type
of motive the courts have required in finding state assistance to be a
significant factor on the issue of state action. The courts have dif-
fered on the question of whether or not, in a particular case, a public
utility's conduct constitutes state action. It is undisputed, however,
that there is a much greater likelihood that a court will find state ac-
tion where the defendant is engaged in performing a public function
vital to the community than it will in a case where the defendant is
a purely private organization acting solely on its own behalf. In
Lucas, the defendant was not acting solely for its own private benefit,
but in distributing electricity to the community at large was perform-
ing a service vital to the public. Therefore, a finding of state action
would be a tenable conclusion.
C. Control
The degree of control exercised by the state over the activities
of the private entity is also important in determining whether or not
there is state action. By "control" is meant the power and authority
of the state, through its agencies, to regulate such things as the ser-
08 See, e.g
., State v. Idaho Power Co., 81 Idaho 487, 346 P.2d 506 (1959); United
States v. Certain Lands in the City of Louisville, 9 F. Supp. 137 (W.D. Ky. 1935);
Superior Laundry & Towel Supply Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 10 Ohio Op. 2d 129, 168
N.E.2d 445 (1959). •
01) A public utility is obligated by the nature of its business to furnish its service or
commodity to the general public, or to that part of the public which it has undertaken
to serve, without discrimination. It must serve all who apply and it cannot arbitrarily
select the persons for whom it will perform its service or furnish its commodity. See,
e.g., People v. Forest Home Cemetery Co., 258 Ill. 36, 101 N.E. 219 (1913), appeal dis-
missed, 238 US. 606 (1914) ; Birmingham v. Rice Bros., 238 Iowa 410, 26 N.W.2d 39,
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 768, rehearing denied, 332 U.S. 820 (1947); United Fuel Gas Co.
v. Battle, 153 W. Va. 222, 167 S.E.2d 890, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 116 (1969).
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vice to be rendered, the type of equipment to be used in rendering
such service, and the rates to be charged." In Mitchell v. Boys
Club,71
 the issue before the federal district court was whether or not
the conduct of the defendant, a private charitable organization, in
segregating its individual clubs, was state action. The court ruled
that:
Government control is the decisive factor in the determina-
tion of whether a corporation is public or private and gov-
ernmental control of the club corporation does not exist. The
club corporation, a private institution, acting on its own ini-
tiative and expressing its own will, may segregate its clubs
without thereby offending . . . the Constitution. 72
In this case the court found that over two-thirds of the adult mem-
bers of the club were private citizens, that the principal officers of
the club were all private citizens, that the club's executive committee
was composed almost entirely of civilians, and that none of the club's
employees was on either the city or state payroll." It concluded that
management and control of the club were in private and not public
hands.
In the Bright v. Isenbarger case, the court said much the same
thing. In addition to finding that the tax exemption granted the pri-
vate school by the state was not sufficiently significant to make its
conduct state action, the court also held that exercise of "some regu-
latory powers over the standard of education . . . does not implicate
it generally in . . . policies [onj discipline.” 14 Here the court based
its holding on the fact that state regulation and control were not all-
encompassing, but were limited to supervision of the quality of edu-
cation, and then only in a general way.
In cases involving public utilities, however, the courts have been
much quicker to find sufficient state control over the utility's activi-
ties, thereby qualifying the utility's conduct as state action. In Pol-
lak," for instance, the Court found state action not only because the
transit company enjoyed a monopoly status and performed a public
function, but primarily because the transit company was subject to
considerable regulation by Congress. The Court found that the type
of service rendered by the Company and the different kinds of equip-
ment to be used by it were subject to regulation by the Public Utilities
Commission of the District of Columbia," as was the type of radio
To See, e.g., Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 454 (1952); Gas Light
Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1136 (1971).
71
 157 F. Supp. 101 (D.D.C. 1957).
72 Id. at 108.
75.
 Id. at 104.
74 Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1394 (N.D. Ind. 1970), citing Powe v.
Miles, 407 F.2d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968).
75 Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952).
76
 Id. at 454.
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programs that the defendant was permitted to play over its loud-
speakers. These examples of regulation were necessary elements in
the court's finding of state action." Likewise in the Gas Light Com-
pany case, the court found state action as a necessary result of the
state's power of control over the defendant's activities. As the court
pointed out: "Defendants' conduct cannot be characterized as indi-
vidual action when we consider the state's intimate involvement with
the rate-making process.""
In Lucas, the Electric Company, in exchange for the monopoly
market guaranteed it by the state, must submit to full and complete
government supervision both by the state through the Public Service
Commission and by the municipality which it serves. No utility may
begin to operate unless and until it first obtains a certificate from
the Public Service Commission authorizing it to do so." The Com-
mission has the power to regulate and supervise all activities of every
public utility and may do all things necessary and convenient to make
this power effective." Every public utility is required by law to fur-
nish the Commission with reports covering in detail every aspect of
its business B1 No utility may change its rates without the written
approval of the Commission after hearing. 82 The Commission is given
power to set up its own rules and regulations governing conduct of
the public utilities," and under this power the Commission has re-
quired all public utilities to conform to such rules and regulations."
While some of these requirements are of a type which are also made
applicable to other privately owned corporations under the state's cor-
porations laws, most of them are not; they apply only to public
utilities. It cannot be denied that the rules and regulations promul-
gated by the state legislature, the Public Service Commission, and
the cities and towns in which the electric company operates, when
combined, provide an exhaustive and comprehensive system of regu-
lation and control by various state agencies over the activities of the
electric company. It is reasonable to deduce state involvement from
this situation.
D. Relationship Between State and Activity
Causing Injury
It is a general constitutional principle that in order for state action
to be found in the conduct of a private entity, the state must be in-
volved not simply with any activity of the entity alleged to have
77
 Id. at 462.
78 440 F.2d at 1140.
72 Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 196.49, 196.50 (1957).
80 Id. § 196.02(1).
81 Id. § 196.12.
82 Id. § 196.20.
83
 Id. § 195.01.
84 Wis. Adm. Code, ch. 6, § 113.01 (1956).
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inflicted injury upon the plaintiff, but with the particular activity that
caused the injury.85 This principle was employed in Bright v. Isen-
barger,8° where the court never reached the constitutional issue of
whether the summary manner in which the plaintiff was expelled from
school for violation of a school disciplinary rule violated her rights to
procedural due process, but disposed of the suit by finding that the
principal's action was not action under color of state law. The court
did find that the state was involved in the affairs of the school to the
extent of its general supervision of the quality of education given at
the school. However, it based its finding of no state action primarily
on the fact that since the state did not interfere in the school's dis-
ciplinary process, the state was not involved in the activity that caused
the injury, that is, the expulsion. Similarly, in the Pollak case the most
convincing argument for the finding of state action was that the Com-
mission—by ordering an investigation into the reasonableness of the
transit company's broadcasts and then by dismissing the investigation
—had directly involved the government in the specific activity causing
the injury, namely, the continued broadcasting of offensive programs.
It was the dismissal of the investigation which made it possible for the
offensive programs to continue, thereby involving the state in the
activity which was the subject of complaint.
In Lucas the particular conduct causing injury was the termina-
tion of plaintiff's electricity by the Electric Company. State involve-
ment arises from a rule promulgated by the Commission permitting the
Company to disconnect a customer's service for non-payment of a bill
without providing for a hearing prior to such termination, and from
the Commission's approval of a Company rule which provides for
notice to the customer of his unpaid bill and for termination of service
within five days in the event the bill is not paid before then. The
question is whether or not these particular acts "significantly involve"
the state in the Company's act of terminating a consumer's electric
service so as to make the state a "joint participant" in the challenged
activity. Although it is true that the state has not expanded the electric
company's common law powers, 87 it would appear that once it chose
to regulate and supervise the utilities in the all-encompassing manner
in which it did, the common law was rendered inapplicable and the
utility was required to look to state-enacted rules and regulations
governing its conduct for authority to act. Here the particular rule
was one that specifically enabled the defendant to terminate electric
service but did not require defendant to hold a prior hearing to deter-
mine liability. The state could have required a prior hearing on the
issue of the consumer's liability for a contested bill before permitting
termination of service. Further, it could have required more in the
85 See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 92 S. Ct. 1965 (1972) ; Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d
73, 81 (2d Cir. 1968).
80 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970).
87 See description of utilities' common law powers at note 52 supra.
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way of notice and could have extended the amount of time in which a
consumer could pay a disputed bill before his electricity could be
shut off. Instead, the Commission explicitly allowed the Company to
specify its own rules of termination and then approved these company-
made rules without modification.
It would appear that the situation in Lucas is quite analogous
to that found in Pollak. In Pollak the court found that the action of the
transit company in broadcasting a radio service, together with the
action of the Commission in permitting such operation, amounted to
sufficient governmental action." Operating a radio service—like ter-
minating electric service in Lucas—is something the transit company
could lawfully do, absent a regulation to the contrary. The Commission
in Pollak could have prohibited the company from so acting, but it
refused to do so. By dismissing its investigation of the Company's
broadcasting, the Commission permitted and actively approved the
Company's conduct. The situation is the same in Lucas: the Commis-
sion could have prohibited the Electric Company from terminating
on five days notice, but it refused to do so, and by enacting section
113.13 (4) and by approving the Company's self-made rule on termi-
nating procedures, it permitted and affirmatively approved and sup-
ported the Company's action. There seems to be no relevant distinction
between Lucas and Pollak which would call for a different conclusion
in each case.
The state of Wisconsin, by according preferential treatment to
the defendant utility company, and by providing it with special benefits
and assistance not made available to other private corporations, has
induced the Company to perform a vital public function which other-
wise would be a responsibility resting with the state. Not only does
the state in this way avoid its responsibility to the general public, but
it also proceeds, quite thoroughly, to control, regulate, and supervise
practically every facet of the utility's operations in ways not applicable
to other private entities. Under these circumstances it would be neither
fair nor consistent to permit the state to absolve itself of all responsi-
bility for actions taken by the utility in furtherance of a public objec-
tive in which the state has such a strong interest. This is especially
true when, as here, the utility enjoys a state-conferred monopoly which
makes it impossible for the dissatisfied consumer to obtain essential
services elsewhere. The utility's actions, therefore, should be considered
state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes.
II. DuE PROCESS
Due process of law requires that a state treat an individual ac-
cording to settled principles of fundamental fairness." This often
88
 Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952).
89 See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
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means that a state must grant an individual notice and an impartial
hearing before terminating any privileges, benefits, interests or entitle-
ments which are alleged to be his constitutional rights." To determine
whether, in a particular instance, notice and a prior hearing are re-
quired, it is necessary to answer the following questions: first, where
the interest of the individual is a constitutionally protected right,"
does the state provide an adequate remedy for redressing impairment
of that right? Secondly, is the interest of the individual in preserving
his rights unimpaired weightier than the government's interest in sus-
taining the challenged activity?
A. Adequate State Remedy
Where a state provides other adequate remedies for the depriva-
tion of a constitutionally protected right, the failure of the state to
provide an impartial hearing to determine the consumer's liability for
a disputed bill prior to termination of service does not violate due
process." In Lucas the court found the following informal and judicial
remedies to be adequate: (1) informal discussion between consumer
and the utility, (2) utilization of the "good offices" of the Commission,
(3) action in tort for damages, (4) suit in equity for injunction, and
(5) payment under protest followed by a suit for refund.
In Lucas the court found that due process requires only that a
fair hearing be granted before termination of benefits, and that the
utility company, through its officers and other employees, could give
the plaintiff such a prior fair hearing even though technically it could
not be considered an impartial arbiter.° 3 The courts have held, how-
ever, that where a constitutionally protected right is involved, not only
must a prior hearing be given, but such hearing must be before an
impartial decision-maker. In Fuentes v. Slievin," the Supreme Court
held that a prejudgment attachment of chattels under Pennsylvania
and Florida replevin statutes was unconstitutional, and in deterinin-
90 See cases cited in note 8 supra.
91 The majority in Lucas expressly assumed that the right to continued electric
service is a constitutionally protected right. Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip
Op, at 11 n.13. In light of other recent court decisions in related areas of the law, it is
highly unlikely that a court today would hold that this right is not constitutionally
protected. For examples of such decisions see note 8 supra.
92 See, e.g., Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); East Coast Lumber Terminal v. Town
of Babylon, 174 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1949).
93 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip Op. at 20-21. In finding that an
impartial arbiter was not necessary, the court relied on Perry v. Sindermann, 92 S. Ct.
2694 (1972); Shirck v. Thomas, 447 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1971); Roth v. Board of
Regents, 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971). in all of these cases the right sought to be pro-
tected was the expectancy of future employment of nontenured teachers. Such a right,
however, is not a right constitutionally protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. This being the case, it is understandable that an impartial hear-
ing was not provided.
94 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
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ing what type of hearing was required by due process, said that there
is no constitutionally acceptable substitute for a "neutral official" as
decision-maker." In Goldberg v. Kelly," the Supreme Court held that
due process requires prior notice and a hearing to determine whether
or not welfare recipients are no longer eligible for welfare benefits,
before such benefits could be terminated; and in addressing itself to
the various elements required for a fair hearing, that Court found that
"an impartial decision-maker is essential."" In several other cases this
same rule has been propounded.'" This being so, it is arguable that any
hearing given by the Electric Company is inadequate, for a company
which is allowed to pass judgment on its own case certainly can not
be considered impartial.
Although it may be true, as the court in Lucas claims, that "the
company's incentive to sell electricity to paying customers is at least
as great as the desire to collect past due accounts,"°° it does not neces-
sarily follow that an official of the Company, when presented with a
complaint, will try to settle it in a fair and even-handed way. The fact
that the consumer's dependence on the utility provides it with an
overwhelming advantage suggests the contrary conclusion. This is
strikingly pointed out in Wood v. City of Auburn, 1" where the court,
in enjoining the shutting off of water because of the alleged non-
payment of a water bill, said:
The consumer, once taken on to the [water] system becomes
dependent on that system for a prime necessity of business,
comfort, health and even life. He must have the pure water
daily and hourly. . .. He cannot wait for the water. He must
surrender, and swallow his choking sense of injustice. Such
a power in a water company or municipality places the con-
sumer at its mercy. It can always claim that some old bill is
unpaid. The receipt may have been lost, the collector may
have embezzled the money yet the customer must pay it
again, and perhaps still again. He cannot resist lest he lose
the water.in
Where, as in the present case, a consumer cannot purchase electricity
elsewhere, he is forced to deal with the company, and if he has already
paid his bill once, he must, nevertheless, "swallow his choking sense of
injustice" and pay it again. He cannot resist lest he lose his electric
uti Id. at 1996.
96 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
07 Id. at 271.
98
 In Re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955): "[/110 man can be a judge In his
own case and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome ;"
see also Richardson v. Wright, 92 S. Ct. 788 (1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510
(1927).
99
 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip Op. at 18.
too 87 Me. 287, 32 A. 906 (1895).
101 Id. at 292-93, 32 A. at 908.
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service. The Company cannot be considered an impartial arbiter
because it is a party to the claim in dispute. Consequently, it is sub-
mitted that discussion with representatives of the utility is not an
adequate remedy.
Whether or not utilizing the "good offices" of the Wisconsin Pub-
lic Service Commission is an adequate remedy presents a slightly
different problem. Here the objection cannot be made that the Com-
mission is incompetent to act as an impartial arbiter. The Commission
does not have an interest in the outcome of the dispute. The problem,
however, is the Commission's lack of power to provide an adjudication
of the issue of the consumer's liability for the disputed bill. For ex-
ample, the Commission allows formal complaints to be brought, in
which the consumer is allowed to appear and present his case, only
in those cases in which twenty-five or more private citizens join in the
complaint. 102 The plaintiff in Lucas cannot avail himself of this remedy
simply because it is doubtful that there are twenty-five potential
plaintiffs at this time. Furthermore, in McNeese v. Board of Educa-
tionm the Supreme Court expressed grave doubt as to whether this
type of administrative remedy was constitutionally adequate. In Mc-
Neese, the state remedy in question was the Illinois School Code,
which permitted petitioners to file a complaint alleging discrimina-
tion with the Superintendent of Schools—who would then be required
to hold a hearing on the matter—only if the petitioners could first
obtain the subscription of fifty residents or ten percent of the school
district, whichever was less. The Court there said: "It is by no means
clear that Illinois law provides the plaintiff with an administrative
remedy sufficiently adequate to preclude resort to federal court." °4
Furthermore, where a complaint is made to the Commission, and
where the Commission investigates the consumer's claim and finds it
meritorious, it cannot order the utility not to terminate service, but,
under present rules, can only request that it not do so."5 This remedy,
then, must also be considered inadequate. The fact that disputes are
sometimes resolved by mutual agreement as a result of the Commis-
sion's actions does not change the fact that there is no guarantee that
a particular dispute will be solved in this manner.
The majority in Lucas also referred to an action in tort for dam-
ages as a judicial remedy open to the plaintiff. It would not seem, how-
ever, that this remedy could be considered adequate, for once the
damage is done through termination of the consumer's electric service,
no amount of damages rendered at a later time will rectify the situa-
tion or recompense the plaintiff for the harm he has already suffered.
In Fuentes v. Shevin,"° the Court said:
102 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip Op. at 5.
103 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
104 Id. at 674-75.
1" Brief for Appellee at 12, Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip Op.
100 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
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If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full pur-
pose, then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when
the deprivation can still be prevented. . . . [NJ o damage award
can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that was subject
to the right of procedural due process has already occurred.
"This court has not . . . embraced the general proposition
that a wrong may be done if it can be undone."'"
Traditionally, the reason for allowing suits for injunction in a case
such as Lucas is the common belief that termination of electric service
or other essential utilities causes irreparable injury that cannot be
adequately compensated for at a later time in an action for damages.
Viewed from this perspective, then, an action for damages must be
considered inadequate."'
The remedy of payment under protest and suit for refund was a
remedy which the courts began to apply to cases such as Lucas when
they came to realize that there was a great inequality of bargaining
power between utilities and consumers.'" It is suggested that if this
remedy ever was adequate it no longer is today. One objection is that
the remedy of payment under protest followed by a suit for refund
would require the consumer to part, at least temporarily, with an
amount equal to the disputed bill. If the consumer is indigent he may
not be able to do this and still be able to afford the necessities of
day-to-day living. It is not just the permanent taking of property that
is prohibited by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment;
temporary, nonfinal deprivations of property rights are also consti-
tutionally prohibited.'" A payment under protest, in reality, amounts
to a temporary deprivation of property. As such, a requirement of
such payment should receive the same type of treatment as the require-
ment of posting a security bond which, in certain other cases, has been
struck down as unconstitutional. In Fuentes v. Shevin," for example,
the Supreme Court held constitutionally inadequate state statutes allow-
ing one whose goods were replevied to recover them if, in return, he
surrendered other property pending a final adjudication of the dispute.
In Bell v. Burson,' the state regulations in question permitted an
automobile operator involved in an accident to keep his license only
107
 Id. at 1994-95 (emphasis added).
100
 See, e.g,, Shelton, The Shutoff of Utility Services for Nonpayment: A Plight of
the Poor, 46 Wash. L. Rev. 745 (1971); Atlanta v. Mcjenldn, 163 Ga. 131, 134-35, 135
S.E. 498, 499 (1926); City of Mansfield v. Humphreys Mfg. Co., 82 Ohio St. 216, 227,
92 N.E. 233, 236 (1910). But see Creel v. Piedmont Natural Coal Co., 254 N.C. 324, 118
S.E.2d 761 (1961).
100
 See, e.g., Dawson, Economic Duress—An Essay in Perspective, 45 Mich. L. Rev.
253 (1947); Manhattan Milling Co. v. Manhattan Gas and Electric Co., 115 Kan. 712,
225 P. 86 (1924).
110
 Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
111 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
112 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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if he first posted a security bond pending an ultimate determination
as to his liability for the accident. As in Fuentes, the Supreme Court
struck down the statutes declaring them to be violative of due process.
The same result was reached in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,'"
in which the laws under attack required one whose wages were gar-
nished to obtain their release only after posting a security bond which
was at least equal in amount to the wages in question. In all of these
cases, the statutes requiring the posting of security—like the require-
ment of payment under protest before a suit for refund in Lucas—
only temporarily deprived one of his property. The courts in each case,
however, struck them down as being constitutionally inadequate. Since
payment under protest amounts to the same thing as posting a security
bond, there can be no valid reason for condemning the latter while
upholding the former.
The majority in Lucas, in finding a suit for refund to be a
constitutional and adequate remedy, relied on the fact that the use
of the same or similar procedures has been upheld in cases involving
disputes over the validity of taxes and rent.' 14 These cases, however,
are distinguishable. The particular rent case relied on by the court in
Lucas was that of Lindsey v. Nortnet. 116 In this case the landlord
brought a forcible entry and detainer action against his tenant in which
he claimed the right of possession because of the tenant's failure to
pay his rent. The tenant admitted that he had failed to pay past-due
rent but claimed that he was freed from his obligation to do so due to
the landlord's failure to fulfill his obligations to keep the premises in a
habitable condition. The Court in this case upheld a state requirement
that a tenant wanting a continuance of an eviction hearing must post
security for accruing rent during the continuance. In this case the
tenant did not dispute the fact that he failed to pay past rent. In
Lucas, however, the plaintiff made no such admission as to the past
electric bill in question and instead claimed that he had paid each and
every one. Furthermore, in Lindsey the security requirement was not
meant to apply to past rent if the court should find it due. It was only
meant to apply for rent which was presently accruing during continua-
tion of the hearing the tenant was still in possession of the premises.
No matter what obligations the landlord had failed to perform, the
tenant was still currently receiving a benefit, namely his possessory
interest in the premises. Furthermore the Court in Lindsey held that
the state of Oregon, if it so desired, could treat the obligations of the
tenant and those of the landlord as independent rather than dependent
covenants.' This being so, the tenant's obligation to pay his full rent
was in no way changed or modified by unlawful acts or omissions on
113 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
114 Lindsey v. Normet, 92 S. Ct. 862 (1972); see also Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
115 92 S. Ct. 862 (1972).
116 Id. at 871.
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the landlord's part which diminish the value of the tenant's possessory
interest.
Whereas in Lindsey the security bond was meant to be used only
as payment for a benefit which the tenant was then receiving, in Lucas
the "security"—that is, payment under protest—was to be used as
payment of a past bill, and not as security for payment of present
services rendered. The plaintiff in Lucas was perfectly willing to pay
for present services rendered and had done so for quite a while prior
to suit."? The tenant in Lindsey is getting something in return for the
security he pays; this is not so in Lucas. Furthermore, as the Lindsey
case pointed out, a tenant, in order to remain in possession of the
premises, is not required to pay back rent (as opposed to accruing
rent) until after it is proved, in a judicial proceeding, that he is
obligated by law to do so. This is in accordance with the general rule
that "he who asserts something to be due him, not he who denies a
debt, shall have the burden of judicial action and proof."' If the
plaintiff in Lucas, however, were required to pay his disputed bill
before he would be entitled to receive continued electric service, then
he would be required to do so before it was ever proved that he had
an obligation to do so. This would be in direct conflict with the general
rule stated above. The Lindsey case, therefore, is not a valid authority
for the proposition that a suit for refund is a constitutionally adequate
remedy.
Nor does the case of Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huff-
man"° lend support to the remedy of a suit for refund. In this case the
court upheld a requirement that a taxpayer first pay a state tax under
protest before he could sue for its return. The fact is that the require-
ment of payment under protest is limited to cases involving the pay-
ment of revenue to the government. 12° The purpose for this exception
to the general rule is "to leave undisturbed the state's administration
of its taxes." If a taxpayer could require the government to grant him
a hearing prior to payment of disputed taxes, then the government
would be unable to spend and otherwise distribute these funds effec-
tively and efficiently for the benefit of the general public. This, then,
would work to the disadvantage of the entire populace and not just to
one individual or group. In all other cases, however, in which the pay-
ment of revenue to the government is not in issue, this same reasoning
does not apply, and hence there is no need to extend the exception
further. In sum, the Huffman case also fails to provide valid authority
for holding that in Lucas payment under protest followed by a suit
for refund is a constitutionally adequate remedy.
117 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip Op. at 3.
118 Wood v. Auburn, 87 Me. at 293, 32 A. at 908. See also Pabst Corp. v. City of
Milwaukee, 193 Wis. 522, 527, 213 N.W. 888, 890 (1927).
110 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
120 Wood v. Auburn, 87 Me. at 293, 32 A. at 908; Pabst Corp. v. City of Milwaukee,
193 Wis. at 527, 213 N.W. at 890.
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A suit for injunction also appears to be inadequate for many of
the same reasons that make a suit for refund inadequate. Before one
can bring a suit for injunction he must first post a bond at least equal
in amount to the disputed claim. If he is a poor person, he may not
be able to do so and still be able to afford other essentials for living.
In comparing the requirement of posting a bond in order to bring an
action with a prejudgment garnishment of one's wages, one author said:
[T]he poor litigant has the alternative [to posting a bond]
of failing to post a bond and thus forfeiting his legal rights.
. . . [T]he property interest involved is the use of funds
which may be needed to purchase the necessities of life.
Rights are of little value without remedies. . . . The bond
requirement, then, not only has a chilling effect on the liti-
gant's right to bring or defend an action, but it can clearly
deprive the litigant of needed funds before he has had an
opportunity for a hearing.'21
In short, the unequal battle between the utility and the consumer
makes it inequitable to place the burden on the individual to initiate
court action either in an action at law or in a suit in equity."' In all
cases other than those concerning the payment of taxes, the one who
asserts that something is due him, and not the one who denied the
debt, should have the burden of judicial action and proof. Therefore
it is submitted that all of the remedies available to the plaintiff, upon
which the majority relied in Lucas, are legally inadequate.
B. Balancing Test
To determine whether or not the state must grant one an impartial
hearing prior to depriving him of his constitutional rights, it is first
necessary to weigh the individual's interest in obtaining such a hearing
against the government's interest in taking summary action.'" Not
only will this balancing test determine whether or not a hearing is
necessary, but, where it is determined to be necessary, it will also
determine the nature and extent of the hearing required.'"
In cases involving the deprivation of one's constitutional rights,
it is a rare case in which the courts will find that the government's
interest is weightier and that therefore a prior hearing is not required.
121 Note, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 986, 1007-08 (1970).
122 Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., Slip Op. at 49 (dissenting opinion).
123 See, e.g., Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 US. 886 (1961) ; Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360 (1959); Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (Frank-
furter, J. concurring); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967).
129 Note, supra note 121, at 995-96 n.51; Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807, 811
(2d Cir. 1967): "Lilo determine in any given case what procedures due process requires,
the court must carefully determine and balance the nature of the private interest affected
and of the government interest involved."
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Such cases are usually limited to situations in which the governmental
interest involved is either the public health 128 or the national security.'"
Where, however, the governmental interest is basically financial
in nature, and where, furthermore, the individual's interest is in pre-
serving his right to a necessity of life, the courts have consistently
ruled in favor of the individual and have required an impartial hearing
before terminating the individual's rights.'" Continued electric service,
for one who depends on it for heating, lighting, cooking and.refrigera-
don, is essential to day-to-day living and affects the consumer's day-
to-day sustenance. The governmental interests involved—to preserve
fiscal integrity,128 to prevent spurious claims,'" and to see to it that
125 Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 601 (1950). The Court
weighed the governmental interest of preventing potential physical injury to the public
from misbranded articles against injury to the purveyor of the articles resulting from
temporary interference with its distribution, found the government's interest to be
weightier, and held that an impartial hearing prior to temporary seizure of the goods
was not constitutionally required. See Note, 19 DePaul L. Rev. 552, 564 (1970).
125 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The Court found that the
interest of the federal government during World War II in preserving national security
outweighed the interest of the individual plaintiff—an American citizen of Japanese
descent—in being able to move about freely. .
127 Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 1999 n.22 (1972): "A prior hearing always
imposes some costs in time, effort, and expense, and it is often more efficient to dispense
with the opportunity for such a hearing. But these rather ordinary costs cannot outweigh
the constitutional right." Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (the
Court found that wages were a "specialized type of property" and that the interest of a
wage-earner in receiving his wages outweighed the competing interests of both the state
and the creditor); Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (the court found that the right of a student to an
education is a vital right "basic to civilized society" and that it outweighs the interest
of the Board of Education in speedily processing such administrative matters); Kelly
v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) (here the court found that the interest of the plaintiff welfare
recipient not to be deprived of assistance was an "overpowering need" greatly out-
weighing the state's interest in protecting public funds). See Comment, The Growth of
Procedural Due Process Into a New Substance: An Expanding Protection for Personal
Liberty and a "Specialized Type of Property . in our Economic System," 66 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 502, 506-507 (1971): "Courts are now refusing to allow the initial deprivation
without prior notice and an opportunity to be heard where a withholding of property
essential to day to day living is involved . . . and where the consequences of an er-
roneous preliminary decision is an infringement of liberty or a hardship affecting an
innocent person's day to day sustenance. In this type of case, the balance, if any, should
always be in favor of the individual's personal interests in receiving prior notice and an
opportunity to be heard . . . ."
128 In 1969 only 71 consumers with disputed claims—out of approximately 600,000
people serviced by Wisconsin Electric Power Company—went so far with their disputes
as to contact either the Public Service Commission, the Better Business Bureau, a news-
paper, or a public utility officer. Judge Sprecher, in his dissenting opinion, expresses the
belief that if a hearing is required prior to termination of services, to determine the con-
sumer's liability for a disputed bill, the number of people who will decide to take
advantage of such a hearing will not increase all that much. Lueas v. Wisconsin Electric
Power Co., Slip Op. at 52. If this is so, the cost to the government would not be nearly
as much as it might at first appear.
129 The problem of spurious claims might, to a certain extent, be avoided by re-
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paying customers get service at as low a rate as possible—are all
basically financial in nature. Consequently, it is submitted, the con-
sumer's interest must be considered the weightier, and he must be
granted an impartial hearing before being made to suffer the loss of
his right to electric service.
The balancing of competing interests does not end here, for the
type of hearing that is required must still be determined. It has been
said that "the extent to which local government will experience finan-
cial and administrative problems and difficulties will depend largely on
just what type of hearing must be held to satisfy minimum require-
ments of due process." 13° It is for this reason that minimum procedural
due process requirements must reflect the balance between the govern-
ment's interest in fiscal economy and administrative efficiency, and the
individual's interest being affected by governmental action.'" A formal
hearing will substantially add to the government's expense and, quite
naturally, will greatly increase the amount of time required to settle
disputes. If such a hearing is not absolutely necessary, then, only an
informal hearing should be provided. In Goldberg v. Kelly 182 the
Supreme Court was of the opinion that "the pretermination hearing
[prior to termination of welfare benefits] need not take the form of a
judicial or quasi-judicial trial" and that an informal hearing would be
sufficient to provide the essential elements of fairness.'" In Dixon v.
Alabama State Board of Educationim the Fifth Circuit explicitly held
that an informal bearing was all that was required to determine
whether or not a student was guilty of misconduct and could therefore
be expelled.'" In other cases in which similar interests were involved,
the courts, by implication, indicated that an informal hearing satisfied
the requirements of fairness essential to due process.'" Since the right
to continued electricity does not differ in importance from the rights
involved in the above cases, it would seem that an informal hearing
would be a necessary and sufficient guarantee of procedural due
process.'"
quiring that the consumer make a preliminary showing that his dispute with the utility
is made by him in good faith, before allowing him to take advantage of prior hearing.
See Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983, 2002 n.33 (1972): "Leeway remains to develop
a form of hearing that will minimi7e unnecessary cost and delay while preserving the
fairness and effectiveness of the hearing.. . ." Note, supra note 121, at 1009.
130 See Note, supra note 125, at 570.
131
 Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 867 (2d Cir. 1970).
182 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
183
 Id, at 266-67.
134
 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
185
 Id. at 159.
188
 See, e.g., Caulder v. Durham Housing Authority, 433 F.2d 998 (4th Cir. 1970);
Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1970); Goliday v.
Robinson, 305 F. Supp. 1224 (N.D. III. 1969).
187
 It is suggested that the Public Utilities Commission, or any one of its individual
members, is a suitable arbiter before whom such a hearing could be held. Unlike the
utility company which Is threatening to terminate service, the Commission, or one of
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CONCLUSION
In Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, the facts that the
state of Wisconsin gave the Electric Company a great deal of assistance
and support; that its motive in doing so was to enable the Company
to perform what may be classified as a public function; that the Com-
pany did in fact perform a function vital to the community; that the
state exercised great control over the Company's activities; and that
the state specifically permitted the Company to terminate electric
service for nonpayment of a disputed bill, when taken together, show
"significant involvement" of the state in the affairs of the Company,
make the state a "joint participant" in the Company's termination of
the plaintiff's electric service, and thereby turn the Company's "pri-
vate" action in discontinuing service into state action. In many states
other than Wisconsin, these same factors can be found in the relation-
ship between the state and its utilities. Accordingly, it is submitted
that whenever a problem arises in any of these jurisdictions concerning
termination of a vital service by a utility, the utility's action should be
considered state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes. Further-
more, since a service such as electricity is a vital service in all parts
of the country, in all states due process should require that a prior
impartial hearing be given before service is actually discontinued.
WILLIAM J. TUCKER
Uniform Commercial Code—Sections 1-201(19), 2-103(1) ( b ), 9-
307(1)—Good Faith Requirement for Buyer in Ordinary Course-
Sherrock Brothers v. Commercial Credit Corporation. 1—Plaintiff
Sherrock Brothers, an automobile dealer, purchased two new auto-
mobiles from Dover Motors, another dealer, which had a floor plan
financing agreement for its vehicles with defendant, Commercial Credit
Corporation. Pursuant to the sales agreement, plaintiff made payment
to Dover but allowed Dover to retain possession of the two automobiles
for several days in order that Dover might use these vehicles for dis-
play purposes. Dover agreed that it would then deliver the vehicles to
Sherrock Brothers. Before Dover delivered the cars, however, Com-
mercial discovered that Dover had been selling cars "out of trust."'
Therefore, citing a provision in its security agreement with Dover
its members, has no interest in the outcome of the dispute, and hence could be relied on
to conduct a fair hearing and render an impartial decision.
The question of precisely what elements of a fair hearing are necessary in order to
satisfy due process requirements is open to some dispute. However, a consideration of
these elements is beyond the scope of the present article.
1 290 A.2d 648 (Del. 1972).
2 The term "out of trust" refers to the practice whereby a debtor under a secured
transaction sells the goods subject to the security agreement to a third party and does
not satisfy his financial obligation to his creditor. Sherrock Brothers v. Commercial
Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708, 709 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971),
343
